Under Which Conditions Do Populist Governments Use Unpolitics in EU Decision‐Making

Until recently, we knew very little about the role of populist governments in EU decision‐making. The “crucial case” of refugee distribution within the EU demonstrated that their behaviour was ruled by unpolitics: they rejected formal and informal rules of decision‐making if these were not conducive to their preferred outcome, they rejected traditional means of ensuring compromises, and they rejected solutions to perpetuate crises. However, to what extent is unpolitics a phenomenon unique to migration—an area prone to (nativist) populist capture? This thematic issue compares the behaviour of populist governments in the Council of the EU across different policy areas. The goal is to better understand under which conditions unpolitics is more likely to manifest in EU decision‐making. We argue that unpolitics is intrinsically linked to vote‐seeking strategies, where populist governments use EU decision‐making to mobilise domestic audiences. Hence, unpolitics is more prone to “high gain” and “low risk” issues, since they can be more easily politicised. Unpolitics is also more likely to manifest in venues that act as a tribune, where populist actors can directly speak to domestic audiences. Finally, since unpolitics relies on the mobilisation of voters, it is essentially a two‐level game largely determined by domestic political and socioeconomic conditions. Overall, we see that, although the EU institutions have proved relatively resilient, unpolitics is gradually unsettling and hollowing out norms, institutions, and discourses.