Success of a tax amnesty: At the polls, for the fisc?

Werner W. Pommerehne; Peter Zweifel

doi:10.1007/BF00123742

Success of a tax amnesty: At the polls, for the fisc?

Werner W. Pommerehne
, Peter Zweifel

Research output: Journal contributions › Journal articles › Research › peer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper provides a model for analyzing an individual's voting decision on tax amnesty and the change of his reporting behavior given amnesty is granted/rejected. Success at the polls is predicted to increase with higher penalties meted out to detected evaders while success in terms of reporting would be jeopardized. These and other implications of the model are empirically tested for two Swiss tax amnesty proposals, one rejected, the other approved by a majority of citizens/taxpayers.

Original language	English
Journal	Public Choice
Volume	72
Issue number	2-3
Pages (from-to)	131-165
Number of pages	35
ISSN	0048-5829
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00123742
Publication status	Published - 01.12.1991
Externally published	Yes

Research areas and keywords

Management studies
Politics

ASJC Scopus Subject Areas

Economics and Econometrics
Sociology and Political Science

Access to Document

10.1007/BF00123742

Cite this

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title = "Success of a tax amnesty: At the polls, for the fisc?",

abstract = "This paper provides a model for analyzing an individual's voting decision on tax amnesty and the change of his reporting behavior given amnesty is granted/rejected. Success at the polls is predicted to increase with higher penalties meted out to detected evaders while success in terms of reporting would be jeopardized. These and other implications of the model are empirically tested for two Swiss tax amnesty proposals, one rejected, the other approved by a majority of citizens/taxpayers.",

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KW - Politics

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ER -

Success of a tax amnesty: At the polls, for the fisc?

Abstract

Research areas and keywords

ASJC Scopus Subject Areas

Access to Document

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Cite this