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Generic substitution, financial interests, and imperfect agency

    Research output: Journal contributionsJournal articlesResearchpeer-review

    20 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Policy makers around the world seek to encourage generic substitution. In this paper, the importance of prescribing physicians' imperfect agency is tested using the fact that some Swiss jurisdictions allow physicians to dispense drugs on their own account (physician dispensing, PD) while others disallow it. We estimate a model of physician drug choice with the help of drug claim data, finding a significant positive association between PD and the use of generics. While this points to imperfect agency, generics are prescribed more often to patients with high copayments or low incomes.

    Original languageEnglish
    JournalInternational Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics
    Volume13
    Issue number2
    Pages (from-to)115-138
    Number of pages24
    ISSN1389-6563
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 01.06.2013

    Research areas and keywords

    • Management studies
    • Brand-name drugs
    • Drug dispensing
    • Generic substitution
    • Physician agency
    • Prescribing behavior

    ASJC Scopus Subject Areas

    • Finance
    • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
    • Health(social science)

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