Base Salaries, Bonus Payments, and Absenteeism among Managers in a German Company

Description

Questions about compensation structures and incentive effects of pay-for-performance components are important for firms' Human Resource Management as well as for economics in general and labor economics in particular. This paper provides scarce insider econometric evidence on the structure and the incentive effects of fixed base salaries, paid bonuses, and agreed bonuses under a Management-by-Objectives (MBO) incentive scheme. Six years of personnel data of 177 managers in a German company are analyzed. The main findings are: (1) base salaries increase significantly with age, whereas bonuses decrease with age; (2) larger agreed bonuses are correlated with fewer absent working days.

Period	27.08.2012 → 31.08.2012
Event title	27th Annual Congress of the European Economic Association | 66th European Meeting of the Econometric Society 2012
Event type	Conference
Conference number	27
Organisers	The Econometric Society, Universidad de Málaga, European Economic Association
Sponsors	European Economic Association, The Econometric Society
Location	Malaga, SpainShow on map
Degree of Recognition	International