The implications of central bank transparency for uncertainty and disagreement

  • Boonlert Jitmaneeroj
  • , Michael J. Lamla*
  • , Andrew Wood
  • *Korrespondierende/r Autor/-in für diese Arbeit

Publikation: Beiträge in ZeitschriftenZeitschriftenaufsätzeForschungBegutachtung

17 Zitate (Scopus)

Abstract

Using survey data from 25 economies we provide evidence that greater transparency surrounding monetary policy reduces uncertainty of interest rates and inflation, primarily by reducing uncertainty that is common to agents rather than disagreement between agents. This suggests that studies that focus on disagreement as a proxy for uncertainty understate the benefits of monetary policy transparency. The adoption of inflation targets and forward guidance are both associated with lower uncertainty, although inflation targets have a stronger impact on reducing uncertainty than forward guidance. Moreover, there are diminishing benefits from ever higher levels of transparency. Taken as a whole, our results support the contention that clarity of communication is as important as the magnitude of transparency.

OriginalspracheEnglisch
ZeitschriftJournal of International Money and Finance
Jahrgang90
Seiten (von - bis)222-240
Seitenumfang19
ISSN0261-5606
DOIs
PublikationsstatusErschienen - 01.02.2019
Extern publiziertJa

Fachgebiete und Schlagwörter

  • Volkswirtschaftslehre

ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete

  • Finanzwesen
  • Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie

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