Tax enforcement and corporate profit shifting

Florian Baumann; Achim Buchwald; Tim Friehe; Hanna Hottenrott; John Philipp Weche Gelübcke

doi:10.1080/13504851.2016.1240331

Tax enforcement and corporate profit shifting

Florian Baumann
, Achim Buchwald
, Tim Friehe^*
, Hanna Hottenrott
, John Philipp Weche Gelübcke

^*Korrespondierende/r Autor/-in für diese Arbeit

Publikation: Beiträge in Zeitschriften › Zeitschriftenaufsätze › Forschung › Begutachtung

4 Zitate (Scopus)

Abstract

We present empirical evidence suggesting that weak tax enforcement proxied by the extent of tax evasion in a country acts like a lower corporate tax rate in attracting profits of multinational corporations.

Originalsprache	Englisch
Zeitschrift	Applied Economics Letters
Jahrgang	24
Ausgabenummer	13
Seiten (von - bis)	902-905
Seitenumfang	4
ISSN	1350-4851
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2016.1240331
Publikationsstatus	Erschienen - 29.07.2017

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Volkswirtschaftslehre

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Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie

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10.1080/13504851.2016.1240331

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@article{ff40475f583d4873838f1ab265053acb,

title = "Tax enforcement and corporate profit shifting",

abstract = "We present empirical evidence suggesting that weak tax enforcement proxied by the extent of tax evasion in a country acts like a lower corporate tax rate in attracting profits of multinational corporations.",

keywords = "Economics, corporate taxes, profit shifting, Tax avoidance, tax evasion",

author = "Florian Baumann and Achim Buchwald and Tim Friehe and Hanna Hottenrott and \{Weche Gel{\"u}bcke\}, \{John Philipp\}",

year = "2017",

month = jul,

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doi = "10.1080/13504851.2016.1240331",

language = "English",

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T1 - Tax enforcement and corporate profit shifting

AU - Baumann, Florian

AU - Buchwald, Achim

AU - Friehe, Tim

AU - Hottenrott, Hanna

AU - Weche Gelübcke, John Philipp

PY - 2017/7/29

Y1 - 2017/7/29

N2 - We present empirical evidence suggesting that weak tax enforcement proxied by the extent of tax evasion in a country acts like a lower corporate tax rate in attracting profits of multinational corporations.

AB - We present empirical evidence suggesting that weak tax enforcement proxied by the extent of tax evasion in a country acts like a lower corporate tax rate in attracting profits of multinational corporations.

KW - Economics

KW - corporate taxes

KW - profit shifting

KW - Tax avoidance

KW - tax evasion

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84992170507

U2 - 10.1080/13504851.2016.1240331

DO - 10.1080/13504851.2016.1240331

M3 - Journal articles

AN - SCOPUS:84992170507

SN - 1350-4851

VL - 24

SP - 902

EP - 905

JO - Applied Economics Letters

JF - Applied Economics Letters

IS - 13

ER -

Tax enforcement and corporate profit shifting

Abstract

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