Abstract
We explore the consequences of losing confidence in the price-stability objective of central banks by quantifying the inflation and deflationary biases in inflation expectations. In a model with an occasionally binding zero-lower-bound constraint, we show that an inflation bias as well as a deflationary bias exist as a steady-state outcome. We assess the predictions of this model using unique individual-level inflation expectations data across nine countries that allow for a direct identification of these biases. Both inflation and deflationary biases are present (and sizable) in inflation expectations of these individuals. Among the euro-area countries in our sample, we can document significant differences in perceptions of the European Central Bank's objectives, despite having a common monetary policy.
| Originalsprache | Englisch |
|---|---|
| Erscheinungsort | Washington DC |
| Verlag | Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US) |
| Seitenumfang | 51 |
| DOIs | |
| Publikationsstatus | Erschienen - 06.2019 |
| Extern publiziert | Ja |
Fachgebiete und Schlagwörter
- Volkswirtschaftslehre
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