Executive Prerogatives in the Legislative Process and Democratic Stability: Evidence from Non-Presidential Systems

In their seminal Presidents and Assemblies, Shugart and Carey regard executive prerogatives over legislation as a potential threat to democratic stability. This article asks whether this claim is also valid beyond presidential systems. A long-term analysis of four cases (Britain, France, Sweden and Germany) over the 1866–2015 period leads to three preliminarily conclusions. First, executive prerogatives – the veto, privileges in the introduction of certain pieces of legislation and decree powers – can also be found in (emerging) parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. Second, even legislatures in non-presidential systems are able to balance the representativeness and efficiency of legislation. Third, there is evidence that the origins of this ability lie in the occurrence of and successful defences against vital threats to legislative democracy. Taken together, these findings suggest that executive prerogatives over legislation are not a problem (as envisaged by Shugart and Carey) but a potential solution with respect to democratic stability.